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A scheme for quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) network is proposed with a sequence
of polarized single photons. The single photons are prepared in the same state |0〉 by the server
on the network, which will reduce the difficulty for the parties to check eavesdropping. The users
code the information on the single photons with two unitary operations, I and U = σx which do
not change the measuring bases of the single photons. Some decoy photons which are produced by
operating the sample photons with a Hadamard, are used for preventing the dishonest server Alice
from eavesdropping the quantum lines freely. Also, some photon beam splitters are used to determine
whether the server eavesdrops the quantum communication with a fake signal and cheating. This
scheme is an economical one as it is the easiest way for QSDC network communication securely.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
The combination of the principles in quantum mechan-
ics and the theory of information produces some novel
applications, such as quantum computer and quantum
communication [1]. Quantum cryptography, or quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) [2] provides a secure way
for two remote parties, Bob and Charlie to create a pri-
vate key with which they can communicate securely by
using Vernam one-time pad crypto-system [3]. The non-
cloning theorem [4] and the quantum correlations of an
entangled quantum system ensure the security of QKD.
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [5] proposed an
original point-to-point quantum key distribution scheme
based on the non-cloning theorem [4]. As the state of the
single photon is produced by choosing randomly one of
the two measuring bases (MBs), the rectilinear basis σz
and the diagonal basis σx, a vicious eavesdropper, Eve
will inevitably disturb the quantum system and leave a
mark in the results if she eavesdrops the quantum line.
Moreover, she cannot obtain all the information about
the single-photon state because an unknown quantum
state cannot be cloned. Bennett [6] simplified the BB84
with two nonorthogonal states in 1992 and its efficiency
for qubits ηq, the ratio of the number of valid qubits to
the qubits transmitted, becomes 25%, a half of that in
BB84 QKD [5]. To date, there have been several point-
to-point QKD schemes proposed [2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
Recently, a novel concept in quantum communica-
tion, quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) was
prosed and actively pursued by some groups [13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. With
QSDC, the two authorized users, say the sender Bob
and the receiver Charlie can exchange their secret mes-
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sage directly without creating a private key to encrypt-
ing the message. There are two types of QSDC schemes.
One is based on entangled states, such as those in Refs.
[13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. The other is
based on single photons. Typical such QSDC protocols
are the ones presented in Refs. [24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. Obvi-
ously, the ones with single photons are more convenient
for the users at the aspect of measurements than those
with entangled states. The message in the two point-to-
point QSDC protocols proposed by Schimizu and Imoto
[24] and Beige et al [25] cannot be read out until an ad-
ditional classical bit is transmitted for each qubit. We
[26] proposed a QSDC scheme with a sequence of single
photons, and Cai et al.[27] introduced a QSDC proto-
col with a single photon following some ideas in Bennett
1992 QKD protocol [6]. Lucamarini and Mancini [28]
introduced a QSDC protocol with the same idea in Bid-
QKD protocol [12] and discussed the case with a noise.
A practical application of QSDC requires that an au-
thorized user on a network can exchange the secret mes-
sage directly with the other one. That is, QSDC network
schemes are useful in practical. Although there are a few
QSDC network schemes existing based on entanglements
[29, 30, 31], none with single photons. In this paper, we
introduce an economical QSDC network scheme with sin-
gle photons. The server provides the service for preparing
and measuring the quantum signals, a sequence of single
photons S. Different from QKD network, the server first
sends the quantum signals to the receiver who encrypts
them with the local unitary operations and then sends
them to the sender. The secret message is encoded di-
rectly on the single photons after confirming their secu-
rity. All the parties, including the server agree that the
initial states of the single photons are |0〉, which will re-

























FIG. 1: The subsystem of the present QSDC network. MA,
MB and MC represent the measurements done by Alice, Bob
and Charlie, respectively; E1-E3 represent the eavesdropping
done by Eve in different processes. CB and CC are the codes
done by Bob and Charlie, respectively.
Although a QSDC network is a composite system, its
subsystem can be simplified to three parts, the server (Al-
ice), the sender (Bob) and the receiver (Charlie), similar
to QKD network [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. That is, a great
many of these subsystems compose of the whole network.
A QSDC network scheme is explicit if the principle of its
subsystem is described clearly [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37].
The subsystem in our QSDC network scheme is shown
in Fig.1. Alice provides the service for preparing and
measuring the polarized single photons. The single pho-
tons S0 are prepared initially in the same states |+ z〉 ≡
|0〉. Here | + z〉 is an eigenvector of Pauli operator σz
(called measuring basis — MB σz). Alice sends the pho-
tons S0 first to the receiver Charlie who stores them and
checks the security of the transmission. The procedure
for checking eavesdropping includes two parts. One is
used to check whether the sample photons are in the same
state |0〉 or not, which can be completed by measuring
half the samples with the MB σz. The other is used to
check whether there are more than one photons in each
signal. That is, Charlie should forbid others eavesdrop
the quantum communication with a multiphoton fake sig-
nal attack [39]. This task can be accomplished with some
photon beam splitters (PBSs), similar to Ref.[39]. In de-
tail, Charlie splits each signal in the half of the samples
remaind with three PBSs, shown in Fig.2, and then mea-
sures each signal with a single-photon detector. If there
is only one photon in the initial signal, only one detector
will click. Otherwise, the number of the detector clicked
is more than one with a large probability.
If the receiver Charlie confirms that there is no eaves-
dropper monitoring the quantum line between the server
and him, he operates each photon in the sequence S0
with one of the two local operations I = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|
and U = σx = |0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0| randomly. He keeps the







FIG. 2: The principle of the check against multiphoton fake
signal attack, similar to Ref. [39]. PBS presents a photon
beam splitter 50/50, and Di (i = 1, 2, 3, 4 )are four single-
photon detectors.
dropping efficiently, he should also insert some decoy
photons in the sequence S0. That is, Charlie picks up
some sample photons, say Se from the sequence S0 after
his operations with I and U , and performs a Hadamard
(H) operation on each one. The H operation will make
the photons in Se in the state | + x〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) or
| − x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). That is, the states of the photons
in the sequence S0 are nonorthogonal, which will forbid
the eavesdroppers to eavesdrop the information on the
states freely. After these operations, Charlie sends the
sequence SC (the sequence S0 after Charlie’s operations)
to the sender Bob.
After Bob receives the sequence SC , Charlie chooses
randomly some photons from the sequence SC as the
samples for checking eavesdropping. The samples include
all the photons operated with aH operation Se and some
other photons with only the operation I or U . Charlie
tells Bob the MBs of the samples and requires him to an-
nounce his outcomes obtained by measuring the samples
with the same MBs as those of Charlie’s. Simultaneously,
Bob can also use the same way as Charlie’s to determine
whether there are more than one photons in each sam-
ple. The error rate analysis on the samples can be ac-
complished by the receiver Charlie. That is, he compares
the outcomes published by Bob with his own operations
on the samples. If they believe that the quantum line is
secure, Bob codes his secret message CB on the photons
in the sequence SC by choosing the operation I or U ac-
cording to the bit is 0 or 1, respectively. Certainly, Bob
should add a small trick in the sequence SC before he
sends it out. That is, he should select some of the pho-
tons in the sequence SC as the samples for checking the
security of the transmission between him and the server
Alice, and operates them with I or U randomly. Then
he sends the photons encoded SB to Alice who measures
them with the MB σz . Alice announces the outcomes of
her measurements in public, i.e., CA = CC ⊕ CB. After
checking eavesdropping done by Bob and Charlie with
the photons operated by Bob using I and U randomly,
3Charlie can read out the secret message CB = CA ⊕ CC
directly if the transmission of whole quantum communi-
cation is secure.
In this QSDC network scheme, there are three pro-
cesses for checking eavesdropping, i.e., one for the trans-
mission between the server Alice to the receiver Charlie,
one between the receiver Charlie and the sender Bob,
and the other one between Bob and Alice. Although
the eavesdropper Eve (especially a dishonest server Al-
ice) can eavesdrop the quantum communication, in each
process, between the two parties of the transmission, say
E1, E2 and E3 (see Fig. 1), the eavesdropping checks can
forbid her to monitor the quantum line freely, as the pro-
cess of each transmission is similar to that in BB84 QKD
protocol [5] which is proven unconditionally secure with
error correction and privacy amplification [40]. That is,
Eve’s action will be detected by Charlie and Bob before
Bob codes his message on the photons.
In detail, with the eavesdropping E1, Eve can only ob-
tain the information about the initial states of the pho-
tons, which is known to every one, not a secret. If Eve
wants to steal the information about the operations CC ,
she should insert some Trojan-horse photons in the orig-
inal signal or intercept the photons operated by Charlie
and measure them. Obviously, her actions will inevitably
leave a trace in the first or second process for eavesdrop-
ping check. The reason is that the Trojan-horse photons
will be found out when Charlie measures the samples
with some PBSs as there are more than one detector
clicked for each original signal received from Alice. If Eve
exploits the intercept-resending attack to steal the infor-
mation about Charlie’s operations CC , her action will in-
troduce some errors in the outcomes of the measurements
on the samples in the second process for eavesdropping
check, similar to that in Ref. [8]. The eavesdropping on
the last stage E3 (the transmission between Bob and Al-
ice) will give Eve nothing about the message CB as it is
encrypted by the operations CC [2, 26]. In a word, Eve
cannot steal the information about the secret message
CB freely in an ideal condition. If the noise in the quan-
tum line is not small, on one hand, the parties can purify
the polarized single photons [42] and then perform quan-
tum privacy amplification on them for eliminating the
information leaked to Eve [43]. On the other hand, the
parties can also use this scheme for creating a private key
efficiently if the noise in the quantum line is reasonably
large.
It is of interesting to point out the advantage that the
sequence S0 is first sent to the receiver Charlie, not the
sender Bob. As the secret message CB cannot be dis-
carded, different from the outcomes in QKD, the parties
of the quantum communication have to confirm whether
the quantum line between them is secure [15, 26]. Only
when the quantum line is secure, the sender Bob would
code his message on the quantum information carriers,
a sequence of polarized single photons. The operations
done by Charlie CC carry nothing about the message be-
fore Bob codes the photons. That is, CC is just a raw
key, same as that in QKD before Bob and Charlie con-
firm the security of the transmission between them, and
can be discarded. But after the confirmation is done by
Bob and Charlie, the operations CC become the unique
private key for decrypting the message CB. This order of
the transmissions ensures that the message CB are not
revealed to Eve even though she monitors the quantum
lines.
Another character of this QSDC network scheme is
that the initial states prepared by the server Alice are all
|0〉. It will reduce the difficulty for the parties to check
eavesdropping. In detail, Bob and Charlie can complete
their eavesdropping check without the help of Alice’s,
which can prevent Alice from attacking the communi-
cation with a fake signal and cheating [41]. Moreover,
Charlie can use a H operation to change a photon into a
decoy one efficiently.
Compared with the QSDC network schemes existing
[29, 30, 31], a sequence of polarized single photons is
enough, not entanglements. The users on the network
need only have the capability of performing single-photon
measurement and local unitary operations, not multipar-
tite joint measurements. Moreover, it is unnecessary for
the users to have an ideal single-photon source as the
quantum signals are prepared by the server, which will
simplify the devices of the users on the network. Same
as the point-to-point QSDC scheme [26], almost all the
photons can be used to carry the useful information in
theory. That is, the efficiency for qubits ηq approaches
100%. Except for checking eavesdropping, it is unneces-
sary for the users to exchange the classical information.
Thus this QSDC network scheme is an economical one.
In summary, we have presented a new QSDC network
scheme with a sequence of polarized single photons S. In
this scheme, the server prepares all the quantum signals
initially in the same state |0〉, which will reduce the diffi-
culty for the parties to check eavesdropping. The single-
photon sequence S is first sent to the receiver of the secret
message who encrypts it by choosing one of the two lo-
cal unitary operations I and U randomly. This process
is equivalent to encrypting the photons with a quantum-
one-time pad crypto-system. After confirming the secu-
rity of the single photons encrypted by the receiver, the
sender codes his secret message directly on them. Af-
ter the server announces the combined operations on the
photons, the receiver can read out the message directly.
This scheme is an economical one as it is the easiest way
for QSDC network communication securely.
This work is supported by the National Natural Sci-
ence Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 10447106,
10435020, 10254002 and A0325401, and Beijing Educa-
tion Committee under Grant No. XK100270454.
4[1] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum computation
and quantum information (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK, 2000).
[2] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[3] G. S. Vernam, J. Amer. Inst. Elec. Eng. 45, 109 (1926).
[4] W. K. Wootters and W. H. Zurek, Nature (London) 299,
802 (1982).
[5] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassad, Proc. IEEE Int.Conf. on
Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore,
India (IEEE, New York, 1984), PP.175-179.
[6] C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
[7] W. Y. Hwang, I. G. Koh, and Y. D. Han, Phys. Lett. A
244, 489 (1998).
[8] H. K. Lo, H. F. Chau and M. Ardehali, J. Cryptology
18, 133 (2005).
[9] G. L. Long and X. S. Liu, Phys. Rev. A 65, 032302
(2002).
[10] F. G. Deng and G. L. Long, Phys. Rev. A 68, 042315
(2003).
[11] W. Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[12] F. G. Deng and G. L. Long, Phys. Rev. A 70, 012311
(2004).
[13] K. Shimizu and N. Imoto, Phys. Rev. A 60, 157 (1999).
[14] K. Bostro¨m and T. Felbinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89,
187902 (2002).
[15] F. G. Deng, G. L. Long and X. S. Liu, Phys. Rev. A 68,
042317 (2003).
[16] B. A. Nguyen, Phys. Lett. A 328, 6 (2004).
[17] Q. Y. Cai and B. W. Li, Phys. Rev. A 69, 054301 (2004).
[18] Z. X. Man, Z. J. Zhang and Y. Li, Chin. Phys. Lett. 22,
18 (2005).
[19] C. Wang et al., Phys. Rev. A 71, 044305 (2005); Opt.
Comm. 253, 15 (2005).
[20] F. L. Yan and X. Zhang, Euro. Phys. J. B 41, 75 (2004).
[21] T. Gao, F. L. Yan and Z. X. Wang, J. Phys. A 38, 5761
(2005).
[22] A. D. Zhu, Y. Xia, Q. B. Fan and S. Zhang, Phys. Rev.
A 73, 022338 (2006).
[23] H. Lee, J. Lim and H. Yang, Phys. Rev. A 73, 042305
(2006).
[24] K. Shimizu and N. Imoto, Phys. Rev. A 62, 054303
(2000).
[25] A. Beige et al., Acta Phys. Pol. A 101, 357 (2002).
[26] F. G. Deng and G. L. Long, Phys. Rev. A 69, 052319
(2004).
[27] Q. Y. Cai and B. W. Li, Chin. Phys. Lett. 21, 601 (2004).
[28] M. Lucamarini and S. Mancini, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94,
140501 (2005)
[29] F. G. Deng, X. H. Li, C. Y. Li, P. Zhou and H. Y. Zhou,
Preprint arXiv: quant-ph/0508015.
[30] X. H. Li, P. Zhou, Y. J. Liang, C. Y. Li, H. Y. Zhou and
F. G. Deng, Chin. Phys. Lett. 23, 1080 (2006).
[31] T. Gao, F. L. Yan and Z. X. Wang, Chin. Phys. Le tt.
22, 2473 (2005).
[32] S. J. D. Phoenix, S. M. Barnett, P. D. Townsend and K.
J. Blow, J. Mod. Opt. 42, 1155 (1995).
[33] P. D. Townsend, Nature 385, 47 (1997).
[34] E. Biham, B. Huttner and T. Mor, Phys. Rev. A 54, 2651
(1996).
[35] P. Xue, C. F. Li and G. C. Guo, Phys. Rev. A 65, 022317
(2002).
[36] F. G. Deng, X. S. Liu, Y. J. Ma, L. Xiao and G. L. Long,
Chin. Phys. Lett. 19, 893 (2002).
[37] C. Y. Li, H. Y. Zhou, Y. Wang, and F. G. Deng, Chin.
Phys. Lett. 22, 1049 (2005).
[38] C. H. Bennett and S. J. Wiesner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 69,
2881 (1992).
[39] F. G. Deng, X. H. Li, H. Y. Zhou and Z. J. Zhang, Phys.
Rev. A 72, 044302 (2005).
[40] H. K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 (1999); P.
W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000).
[41] F. G. Deng, X. H. Li, P. Chen, C. Y. Li and H. Y. Zhou,
quant-ph/0604060.
[42] J. I. Cirac, A. K. Ekert and C. Macchiavello, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 82, 4344 (1999); M. Ricci. F. De Martini, N. J.
Cerf. R. Filip, J. Fiura´s˘ek and C. Macchiavello, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 93, 170501 (2004).
[43] F. G. Deng and G. L. Long, quant-ph/0408102.
